This paper aims to assess the level of departure of the actual black market rate from its real level. Our finding indicate divergence of the actual black market rate from the real level, ranging from 7% in October 2016 to about 38% in November 2017. This result imply 38% of the foreign exchange price in the black market rate in November 2017 was due to manipulative trading strategies exerted by a few powerful traders in the market. The study concludes that in the very short term to curb increasing depreciation of the domestic currency rate in the black market, it is essential to control domestic liquidity expansion, and raise the cost (risk) of dealing in the black market by imposing higher penalty cost on dealers in this market.
country in July 2011, and loss of about 75% of oil revenue , the black market rate premium over the official rate expanded rapidly due increasing demand for hard currencies. To control speculative effects on foreign exchange tradings, the the Central bank of Sudan decided to tighten control on exchange bureaux by enforcing additional restrictions on foreign exchange sales and oftenly cracking down on black marketeers for foreign exchange.
To understand the operational mechanism of imperfect market it is essential to decompose the effect of fundamental factors from the effect of nonfundamental speculative strategies on pricing. In competitive efficient market asset prices change only in response to change in fundamental variables. When a trader purchase foreign currency solely for its expected payoff due to future change in fundamentals, the foreign exchane is said to be driven mainly by fundamentals. However, if the market is dominated by non-fundamental speculative motives, the currency price diverge from its fundamental real value. Thus, systematic divergence of the price from its fundamental value is an indication of bubble. Blanchard and Watson, 1982, refer to such type of bubbles as self-fulfilling expectations that push the currency price towards expected price level, which is unrelated to change in the fundamentals of the price.
The expanding gap between black market rate and the official exchange rate in the past few years became a major concern for the authorities in Sudan. Some basic questions we would like to answer in this paper includes: Is the black market rate for foreign exchange in Sudan is a free exchange rate that reflect change in fundamental macroeconomic variables? What are the major factors that nurture the black market foreign currencies in recent years? and finally, what is the best predictor of the black market rate?
To answer the first question we assessed profitability of technical trading rules, to see if speculative trading rules can gain significant profit to currency dealers.To answer the second and third questions we investigated the association between high powered money and change in black market prices.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section two highlights literature review. Section three illustrates technical trading rules and shows how simple trading rules can attract significant gains to traders. The final section concludes the study.
2-Literiture review
Studying volatility in asset markets in general can help controlling asset markets irregularities and detecting volatility boundaries (Bollerslev et al., 2003) . The increasing sensitivity of major economic indicators in underdevolpoed economies to volatility in black market for foreign exchange highlights the importance of modeling volatility in these markets. The literature on black market for foreign exchange takes two approaches: the first approach adapt specification of determinants of black market rate premium. A partial list of articles in this tradition includes Dornbusch et al. (1983) , Fishelson (1988) , Culbertson (1989) , Phylaktis (1992) , and Shachmurove (1999) . The second approach focuses on the impact of black market rate volatility on macroeconomic indicators. Musila and Al-Zyoud (2012) following the latter approach assess the relationship between black market volatility and volume of international trade in sub-Saharan African countries and indicate that reducing volatility in the black market rate increase (though insignificant) international trade flow to these countries. But findings by Makochekanwa (2007) show the black market rate has significant impact on hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, during 1999 -2006. Caporale and Cerrato (2008 ) investigate the long-run relationship between black market and official exchange rates in a number of Asian emerging economies to show weak evidence of long-run equilibrium relationship between the two market rates. In study of exchange markets in India and Sri Lanka, Emran and Shilipi (2010) show black market rates are weak indicators of equilibrium exchange rate. Jayaratnam (2003) investigates the impact of black market premium on FDI to show that reduction in black market premium has little impact on FDI flows in a number of developing countries.
3: Technical Trading Rules and Trading Signals
In recent years more research results unveiled the predictive power of technical trading rules in emerging stock markets. A number of research studies (Besseminder and Chan, 1995; Ratner and Leal 1999; Ito 1999; Kho 1996; Levich and Thomas,1993) , indicated that trading rules showed significant predictive power of profits in a number of Asian markets including Malaysia, Thailand, and Taiwan, but less predictive in more developed markets of Hong Kong and Japan. In a more comprehensive study including Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan, Canada, and U.S., stock markets, Ito (1999) found trading rules captures quite strongly trading patterns (buy and sell signals) in all these markets with exception of the U.S., stock markets. Similar conclusion supporting relevance of trading rules analysis in Latin America stock markets concluded by Ratner and Leal (1999) .
Since efficient market hypothesis imply, prices in efficient markets reflect all available information to the extent that excess returns generated from any additional information cannot exceed transaction costs of trading on that stock (Fama and Blume 1966) , then evidence of profit generation in stock or currency market using past price behavior entails indication of market inefficiency. Thus, investigation of technical trading analysis may have important implications on a market regulations, in addition to its benefit to investors with respect to availability of potential opportunities.
In the following we investigate whether technical analysis can be exploited to predict significant profit returns in the black market.
Simple Technical Rules:
Technical trading rules assume price change follow predictable patterns that can be exploited for trading strategies. While there are different specifications of trading rules, the most simple and more often employed by practitioners are the variable length moving average (VMA), and the trading-range break. To explain these two rules, let 
where t s is the stock price at time t.
Alternatively, to compute the variable moving average rule, a shortperiod moving average (SMA) and a long-period moving average (LMA) rules need to be computed, so that n is set equal to the number of trading days in a week (i.e., n = 3) for SMA, and n>10, for LMA. In this case a buy order can be signaled when it it LMA SMA  , by an amount larger than pre-specified band level; and a sell order when it it LMA SMA  by an amount lower than the band. The trading-range break signals buy order when the price rises above its last local maximum (the resistance level), and a sell order when the price sink below its last local minimum (the support level).
The t-test statistics for the buys (sells) are defined as: And the t-test statistics for the buy-sell are defined as:
,   are respectively the buy and sell mean returns and the number of days for the buys and sells. In the table the term (1,20,0.01) refer to the short period is one day, the long period is 20 days, and the band is 1%. (1) In tables (3) and (4), we simulated a hypothetical example of three traders who are able to cordinate among themself as in the oligopoly models, under two senarios. The first senarion in table (3) shows sustainability of the cordinated tradings when traders have a fixed amount of domestic cuurency balance and trade a fixed amount of foreign currency among themselves (US$10). In such case the trading in FX is not sustainable even when they have a market power to set price at the levels they want. This can be indicated by the declining amount of foreign currency balance from US$ 33 in the initial period 1 to US$19 in the final period.
Results in table
However, under the second senario it is assumed that traders have the same fixed amount of foreign currency, but they have access to increasing domestic currency balance. In this case the trading of FX in the black market becomes sustainable, as their total balance in foreign exchange increase from US$44 in the initial period to about US$ 100 in the final period. These results imply as long as traders in black market for foreign exchange have access to increasing domestic currency, via smuggling activities or whatever, black market activities may not disappear even when foreign currency amounts traded in the black market for FX remained fixed.
Given that growth in domestic liquidity (money supply) is fundamental driver of change in black market rate (figure 2), to assess the size of overpricing of the black market rate due to speculative trading of foreign exchange in the black market, we estimated the black market rate consistent with the growth in money supply (M2), and refer to it as realistic rate of the black market rate. As reported in table (5), the excess of the actual black market rate over the estimated rate indicates the size of over-pricing due to speculative trading activities in the black market. (5) show increasing divergence between the estimated and the actual rates. This imply that the size of over-price in the black market increased from 7% in October 2016 to 38% in November 2017.
This result shows the effect of speculative motives, as opposed to fundamental drivers, were more dominant in 2017, albeit in the last four months of 2017. (1) : Buy and sell strategies (2016) 
4-Concluding Remarks:
The findings in this research indicate profitability of variable length moving avergae trading rule by currency traders when traders practice simple trading rule of buying at low price and selling at higher price in periods ranging from one day to three weeks . However, such trading rule cannot support a positive profit gains when resistence and support trading strategies are assumed. To investigate further trading signals we simulated a hypothetical example of three traders who are able to coordinate among themselves as oligopolist, under two senarios. The first senarion assume monetary authority control domestic liquidity so that traders cannot increase their balance of domestic currency. In such case it is indicated that trading in foreign currency in a black market is not sustainable, as the balance of foreign currency declines over time, even when traders enjoy a market power to set prices. However, under the second senario it is assumed that traders have the same fixed amount of foreign currency, but they have access to increase domestic currency balance, implying that monetary authorities unable to control domestic liquidity. In this case trading of foreign currency in the black market becomes sustainable, as traders foreign currency balance increases continously over time. These results imply as long as traders in black market for foreign exchange have access to increasing domestic currency, via gold smuggling, export under-invoicing, or import over-invoicing , then black market activities can not disappear if black market is controlled by a few powerful traders who set prices as oligopolist.
Assuming growth in domestic liquidity (money supply) is fundamental driver of change in black market rate, we estimated the extent of overprice in the black market rate due to speculative trading of foreign exchange. Our results indicate the size of over-price in the black market increased from 7% in October 2016 to 38% in November 2017, revealing expanding market power exerted by the black market traders in the last four months of 2017.
